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Theory of International Politics

Kenneth N. Waltz

New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979; Pages: 250

Review © 2001 Branislav L. Slantchev

Reductionist Theories: Imperialism and Neocolonialism

  1. Reductionist approach - the whole is understood by knowing the attributes and the interactions of its parts (p.18). Problem is that internationally, different states have produced similar as well as different outcomes, and similar states have produced different as well as similar outcomes. The same causes sometimes lead to different effects, and the same effects sometimes follow from different causes. Thus, reductionist approach, which locates reasons for war and imperialism within some (or all) states, is insufficient (p.37).
  2. Hobson - because of concentration of wealth in the hands of the few, consumption cannot keep pace with increases in productive power. At a price level that returns a profit, demand will be insufficient to clear the market. As for Keynes, the malfunctioning is caused by maldistribution of wealth, and the solution is for the government, through its taxing and spending powers, to contrive a more equitable distribution of income in order to bring about aggregate demand that will sustain the economy in condition of full employment (p.21). Faced with falling rate of profit at home and with underused resources, investors look abroad for better opportunities, which are found where they have been least exploited - economically backward countries. Governments easily drawn into backing claims of their citizens for fair treatment by, or special privileges from, the native rulers. The competition among nationals of different countries led naturally to waves of imperialism. Thus, imperialism ``implies the use of machinery of government by private interests, mainly capitalists, to secure for them economic gains outside their country'' (Hobson). According to him, two major losses for the imperialist nation: (i) gains insignificant because they go to a tiny minority, while expenses born by nation as a whole: cost of the entire war system, development of militarism, dependence on native troops; (ii) effects abroad: by exporting capital and know-how, they help the backward country develop its resources, and there is nothing to prevent the latter from using it against them later; undermines its position of superiority (p.23)
  3. Lenin - differs in two points: (i) capitalists who control the governments would never permit the redistribution of wealth; thus, imperialism was inevitably a policy of capitalist states in their monopoly stage of development; (ii) cooperative arrangements between capitalist states would never endure, given their shifting fortunes; imperialism inevitably leads to war among capitalist states.
  4. Problems with imperialism - (i) economic theory does not necessarily imply imperialism; showing how capitalist states generate surpluses does not determine how these surpluses will be used; (ii) some imperialist states exported little capital, some did not produce surplus at all, and some were not even capitalist; (iii) the cause (capitalism) is much younger than the effect it produces (imperialism), as imperialism is as old as recorded history (p.25).
  5. Neocolonialism - designed to save the theory by separating notion of imperialism from existence of empires: (i) in capitalist states private economic interests have become so fully developed, that their informal use is sufficient for the effective control and exploitation of other countries' resources (e.g. multinational corporations). ``Invisible empires'' without the support of governmental policies or national force; (ii) capitalists operating in foreign countries have the effect of freezing economic development at low levels or distorting it disadvantageously (p.29).
  6. Problems with neocolonialism - (i) theory is self-verifying because it asserts that what capitalists do abroad is imperialism whether or not they do it through empires and by force; (ii) structure without behavior because a country is called imperialist by virtue of its attributes and aside from the acts it commits; (iii) problem of change: imperialism endures as long as the imbalance in favor of capitalist states does; prescription tells the poor to become richer and/or the rich to become poorer (p.35).

Systemic Theories

The analytic method, which works through reducing the entity to its discrete parts and examining their properties and connections. The whole is understood by studying its elements in their relative simplicity, observing the relations between them, and combining them to remake the whole. This analysis will not be sufficient if outcomes are affected not only by the properties and interconnections of the variables but also by the way in which they are organized. If the organization of units affects their behavior and their interactions, then one cannot predict outcomes or understand them merely by knowing the characteristics, purposes, and interactions of the units.

Systems theory seeks to (i) trace the expected careers of different international systems, and (ii) show how the structure of the system affects the interacting units and how they in turn affect the structure (p.40).

Frameworks and Approaches

  1. Rosecrance - framework with four elements: (i) a disruptive source of input (states); (ii) a regulator (institution, such as the Concert of Europe or the League of Nations, or informal processes, such as alliances and balance of power politics); (iii) environmental constraints (set of physical constraints, which influence policy: supply of colonizable land, etc. ); and (iv) outcomes.

    Problems: nothing at the systems level conditions the behavior of states. Environment purely physical, which means that international systems can be determined only by their units viewed as actors (p.42). Approach is reductionist.

  2. Hoffman - defines structure partly according to the arrangement of the parts (the pattern of power) and partly according to the characteristics of these parts (homogeneity or heterogeneity of states). Concrete characteristics of states, such as ambitions of rulers, properties of political institutions, etc., all are part of his definition of structure. Insists that systems are real, that actors must be aware of them, that theorists' categories must correspond to statesmen's aims. Concludes that a new system emerges whenever a noticeable change occurs within the units that constitute it.

    Problems: to sustain a systems approach, one must be able to say which changes represent the normal workings of the system and which mark a shift from one system to another. Hoffman cannot do this because he mingles elements at the unit level of analysis with elements at the systems level. One cannot inductively develop both a description of a system and criteria by which changes within are distinguished from changes between because the entities one looks at and the interactions between them are the system (p.44). Not a theory, but a commitment to a particular intellectual approach (Aaron).

  3. Kaplan - examines six systems: balance of power, loose bipolar, tight bipolar, unit veto, universal, and hierarchic. Identifies five variables that are sufficient for describing the state of each system: the essential rules, the transformation rules, the actor classification, the actor capabilities, and information. Relative importance and the interactions of these variables are not indicated, therefore not a theory.

    Problems: equates motivation and behavior of the actors with the results of their actions or with outcomes. No operational definition of environment, linked to and yet distinct from states that form it, exists. Hence, no way in which the extent of system's influence can be investigated (p.55). Fails to distinguish the interaction of units from their arrangement, whether or not states will follow the rules depends on what the states are like. Examines character and interactions of the variables with the aggregate of their interactions taken as a depiction of the system. Reductionist approach despite systemic terminology.

System Structure

Necessity

  1. Traditionalists (emphasize the structural distinction between domestic and international politics: hierarchy vs. anarchy) and modernists (deny contextual difference and therefore deny the qualitative difference of internal and external politics as well) both focus their attention on the behaving units. But one cannot infer the condition of international politics from the internal composition of states or understand it by summing foreign policies and external behavior of states (p.64). Both schools assume that no important causes intervene between the aims and actions of states and the results their actions produce. The reductionist approach fails to explain continuity and repetitions in international politics which endure despite the differences of the units.
  2. Within a system, a theory explains recurrences and repetitions, not change. Across systems, a theory explains change. Systems theories explain how the organization of a realm acts as a constraining and disposing force on the interacting units within it; they explain why different units behave similarly and produce outcomes within certain ranges (p.72).
  3. Structure: set of constraining conditions, which indirectly affect behavior through (i) socialization which brings members of the group in conformity with its norms, and (ii) competition, which generates an order, the units of which adjust their relations through autonomous decisions and acts. Both (i) and (ii) are aspects of a process by which the variety of behaviors and of outcomes is reduced (p.77).

    Different structures may cause the same outcomes even as units and interactions vary. From uniformity of outcomes one cannot infer that the attributes and the interactions between parts of the system have remained constant. Different ``causes'' may have the same effects and same ``causes'' produce different outcomes. One must know how the real is organized to even be able to tell the causes and effects apart (p.78).

Definition

  1. A system is composed of a structure and of interacting units. The problem of previous theories is their inability to contrive a definition of structure free of the attributes and the interactions of the units. In defining structure, there are three principles:
    1. Ordering - international orders are decentralized and anarchic, formed by the coaction of self-regarding units. International structures are defined in terms of the principal political units of an era, they are individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and unintended; principle of self-help applies, in the absence of agents of system-wide authority, authority degenerates into a particular expression of capabilities (p.88-90). Assume that states seek to ensure their survival.
    2. Functional character of units - states are not formally differentiated by the functions they perform. As long as anarchy prevails, states remain like units. International political structures are defined in terms of states (regardless of the importance of non-state actors, and despite what people refer to as ``sovereignty,'' which only means that a state decides for itself how to cope with internal and external problems, not that it is free to do as it pleases). States are alike in the tasks they face, though not in the ability to perform them. The functions are similar, the distinctions arise from the varied capabilities of states (p.97).
    3. Distribution of capabilities - power is estimated by comparing the capabilities of a number of units. Although capabilities are attributes of units, the distribution of capabilities is a system-wide concept. Relations in terms of groupings (alliances) is not appropriate because structural definitions deal with the relations of units in terms of the organization of the realms, not in terms of accommodations and conflicts that may occur among them or the grouping they may form (p.98).
    Thus, the range of expectations arises from looking at the type of order that prevails and at the distribution of capabilities within that order. Systems are transformed if one ordering principle replaces another, or if the distribution of capabilities changes, regardless of the order. The criterion of systems change derived from the change in specification of functions of differentiated units drops out because under anarchy, the system is composed of like units (p.101).

Anarchy and Balance of Power

Anarchy

  1. The distinction between international and domestic realms of politics is not in the use or nonuse of force but in the different modes of organization for doing something about it. The international system is one of self-help. Although states are like units functionally, they differ in their capabilities. The structure limits cooperation in two ways: (i) each unit spends a portion of its effort, not in forwarding one's own good, but in providing the means of protecting itself against others because of the condition of insecurity (uncertainty about the other's future intentions and actions) - concern with relative gains; and (ii) a state worries lest it become dependent on others through cooperation because the more it specializes, the more it relies on others; it will seek either to control what it depends on, or lessen the extent of dependency - imperialism and autarky (p.106).

    Structure causes actions to have unintended consequences. So long as one leaves structure unaffected, it is not possible for changes in the intentions and actions of particular actors to produce desirable outcomes or avoid undesirable ones. The problem is that rational behavior, given structural constraints, does not lead to the wanted results (p.109). Hence, awareness and purpose cannot change the quality of international life.

  2. Virtues of anarchy: (i) hierarchic organizations spend a good portion of their effort toward maintenance and struggle for dominance within - the more powerful the states, the more power lodged in the center must be, the stronger the incentive for states to struggle to control it; (ii) organizations that establish relations of authority and control increase security but decrease freedom - in their absence, states are able to concentrate on the politics of the problem and aim for minimum agreement that will permit their existence rather than maximum agreement for sake of unity; (iii) weak states may enjoy considerable freedom if the strong are not bothered by the marginal increases in their capabilities; (iv) the possibility of use of force has sobering effects in that it causes states to face difficult issues, try to understand each other's problems, and work hard to find accommodations (p.114).

Balance of Power

  1. Realpolitik: (i) state's interest provides the spring for action, (ii) necessities of policy arise from unregulated competition among states, (iii) calculations based on those necessities can discover policies to best serve the interests, (iv) success defined as preserving and strengthening the state, is the ultimate test of policy (p.117). Structural constraints explain why these methods are repeatedly used despite differences in the people and states that use them.
  2. Balance of Power Theory: assumes that states are unitary actors who, at minimum, seek their preservation and, at maximum, drive for universal domination. States use (a) internal efforts (increase in capability, military strength, clever strategies) or (b) external efforts (strengthen own alliance or weaken opposing one) to achieve their aims. They exist in a self-help system with no one to come to their aid or deny them the use of whatever instruments may serve their purposes. From the assumed motivation of states and the actions that correspond to them, this theory describes the constraints of that arise from the system these actions produce and the expected outcome, namely, the formation of balances of power. The theory requires no assumption of rationality or of constancy of will. The expectation is not that a balance, once achieved, will be maintained, but that a balance, once disrupted, will be restored one way or another.

    Balance of power prevails whenever two, and only two, conditions are met: (i) that the order be anarchic, and (ii) that it be populated by units wishing to survive (p.121). No requirement as to the number of participating units, pace of technological change, or the existence of a balancer. Also, unlike Morgenthau, it is wrong to assume correspondence of motive and result, and to infer rules for the actors from the observed results of their actions.

    The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system. Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side, for it is the stronger side that threatens them. Bandwagonning and balancing depend on the system's structure (p.127).

Structural Causes and Their Effects

The following compares different international systems and shows how behavior and outcomes vary in systems whose ordering principles endure but whose structure vary through changes in the distribution of capabilities across states. Conclusion is that smaller number of great powers is better than larger (economic reasons), and that of smaller numbers, two is best (security reasons).

Economic Effects: Why Fewer Powers is Better

States are at once limited by their situations and able to act to affect them. They have to react to the actions of others whose actions may be changed by the reaction. As in an oligopolistic market, the outcome is indeterminate. As collusion and bargaining become easier, the fortunes of firms and orderliness of their markets are promoted. Collusion and bargaining become easier as the number of parties declines. Small-number systems favor the produced (bad for markets, good for international politics).
  1. Fewer is better - (i) relative size determines the survival (able to protect themselves, mounting R&D, amassing capital, etc. ); (ii) stability is promoted by the difficulty of entrance of newcomers; (iii) costs of bargaining increase at an accelerating rate; (iv) each member has less incentive to bear the costs of bargaining; (v) as a group shrinks, each member acquires a larger stake in the system and has more incentive to help maintain it; (vi) expected costs of enforcing agreements increase disproportionately; (vii) diversity of parties increases the difficulty of reaching agreements; (viii) the problem of surveillance increases; (ix) predicting and detecting deals that others may make to one's disadvantage become more difficult (p.136).
  2. Interdependence - (i) as sensitivity: price of goods, cost of production, quality of products in some places respond to similar changes elsewhere; the more sensitive a country becomes, the more its internal economic policies have to be brought into accord with external conditions; definition errs because (a) treats the world as a whole, and (b) compounds relations that represent varying degrees of independence for some and dependence for others; (ii) as mutual vulnerability: if the costs of breaking relations or reducing exchanges are about equal for each; tends to decrease as the number of great powers diminishes (p.144). The inequality of nations produces a condition of equilibrium at a low level of interdependence (p.159).

Military Effects: Why Bipolarity is Best

  1. Stability - means (i) the system remains anarchic, and (ii) no consequential variation (one that leads to different expectations about the effect of structure on units) takes place in the number of principal parties (p.162).

    Where two powers contend, imbalances can be corrected through internal efforts. With three, two can gang up on the third and destroy it, returning to a bipolar world. Four is the lowest number that permits external alignment. Five allows for a balancer (requires special circumstances). No threshold beyond five, or four, really (p.163).

  2. Uncertainty - flexible alliances have doubtful advantages: uncertainty about who threatens whom, who will oppose whom, who will gain or lose from the actions of other states. Flexibility increases with numbers, which also increase complexity and uncertainty. Strategy is necessary for making and holding allies. States alter their appearances and adapt to make themselves more eligible. If pressure strong enough, they will deal with almost anyone. Once made, alliances have to be managed. In a multipolar system, one's ally may edge toward opposing camp. Cohesion of blocs is achieved only through expert management, which is exceedingly difficult among near-equals since it must be cooperative. In a moment of crisis a weaker, or more adventurous, party is likely to determine its side's policy. Far from making states more careful, uncertainty increases the risk of war (p.168). In a multipolar world, dangers are diffused, responsibilities unclear, and definition of interests easily obscured. A skillful foreign policy can be designed to gain advantage without antagonizing others and frightening them into united action. Statesmen could hope to push the issue to the limit without causing all potential opponents to unite (p.171) Miscalculation is the greatest danger.

    In a bipolar world, balancing is internal and, therefore, easier and more precise. The major constraints arise from the main adversary, not from one's own associates. It is never in doubt who the danger is coming from. Every gain is the other's loss, therefore the two powers promptly respond to unsettling events. Overreaction is the greatest danger (lesser than miscalculation because it only costs money and limited wars). With time, ideology becomes subordinated to interest, the two powers become accustomed to one another, learn how to interpret each other's moves, how to accommodate and counter them, life becomes predictable, and peaceful coexistence possible (p.173).

  3. Considerations - (i) insufficiency of nuclear weapons to make a state a great power today - states, except superpowers, can no longer enjoy economies of scale militarily, too costly, even for conventional weapons (p.183); (ii) the usefulness of nuclear weapons for maintaining peace - not using force is a sign of strength, better that the weapons they use to cope with the ``security dilemma'' are ones that make waging war most unlikely (p.187); (iii) the illusion that weaker states can do whatever they please because the two great powers are stalemated - this freedom is freedom of the irresponsible, their security provided by others, see previous point (p.185); (iv) inability to exercise political control over others does not betray military weakness - dissuasion easier than compellence, especially if faced not only with task of compelling a political faction but prompting a political order (p.189).
  4. Management - solving the collective action problems internationally. The smaller the number of great powers, and the wider the discrepancies between the few most powerful states and the many others, the more likely are the former to act for the sake of the system and to participate in the management of the affairs of lesser states. The likelihood greatest when the number is reduced to two: concerns are global, not regional. This leads the superpowers to undertake tasks that others have neither the incentive, nor the ability to perform (p.199).

Power

  1. Definition - an agent is powerful to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him. The old definition which equates power with control (i.e. ability to get people to do what one wants them to do) confuses process with outcome. Power is one cause among others, and the common definition omits consideration of how acts and relations are affected by the structure of action. Measuring power by compliance rules out unintended effects. Thus, failure to get one's way is not proof of weakness. Power is a means, and the outcome of its use is uncertain. To be politically pertinent, power has to be defined in terms of capabilities; the extent of one's power cannot be inferred from the results one may or may not get (p.192).
  2. Effects - even though power does not bring control, it: (i) provides the means of maintaining one's autonomy in the face of force that others wield; (ii) permits wider ranges of action, while leaving the outcomes uncertain; (iii) enjoys wider margins of safety in dealing with the less powerful, and has more to say about which games will be played and how; and (iv) gives its possessors a big stake in the system and the ability to act for its sake (p.195). 
@BOOK{waltz-79:theory,
    TITLE     = {Theory of International Politics},
    AUTHOR    = {Kenneth N. Waltz},
    YEAR      = {1979},
    PUBLISHER = {McGraw-Hill},
    ADDRESS   = {New York},
    ISBN      = {0-075-54852-6},
    NOTE      = {Pp. 250}
}