States and Social Revolutions

Theda Skocpol

Cambridge University Press, 1979 (1990 reissue); Pages: 407

Skocpol's conception of social revolution draws upon Marxist emphasis on social-structural change and class conflict. She analyzes the relations between peasants and landlords, and the organizational capacities of these groups, especially access to coercive resources (pp. 13-4). Her approach has three distinguishing characteristics: (i) structuralist - identifies the objective conditions necessary for the emergence of revolutionary situations; (ii) internationalist - traces how transnational economic relations and the international structure of competing states influence domestic developments; (iii) statist - the analysis of emergence of revolutionary situations centers on the relationship of the state, with its administrative and coercive powers, to military competitors abroad, and to dominant classes at home (p. 31).

Social revolutions occur when (a) revolutionary political crisis emerges (due to the regime's inability to cope with international pressure either because of landed upper class opposition to reforms which would endanger its wealth and status, or because of backward agrarian economy), and (b) the sociopolitical structures of the regime are conducive to peasant revolts (so the breakdown of administrative and military organizations during the crisis leaves the dominant class vulnerable to a revolution from below). See table on pp. 155-7 for summary.

The nature of the new regime (the consolidation of a new state) depends upon (a) the specific way in which the old regime broke down; (b) the timing and nature of peasant revolts; (c) socioeconomic legacies of the old regime; and (d) influences of international relations (pp. 172-3).

Summary of Arguments and Subsidiary Points

Emergence of Revolutionary Crises: the old-regime imperial states were unable to meet the challenges of international situations (p. 47). Revolutionary crises emerged because agrarian structures impinged upon autocratic and proto-bureaucratic state organizations in ways that blocked monarchical initiatives to cope with external military competition. The effect of state-sponsored reforms was the downfall of autocracy and disintegration of the administrative and military state organizations, which left the dominant classes without support against revolts from below (p. 99).
Bourbon France: absolutism triumphed under Louis XIV but French bid for European hegemony provoked formation of hostile coalitions against her. At this time, France desperately needed financial resources. Unlike her major competitor, Britain, she was unable to borrow cheaply (backward agriculture restrained industrial growth, no significant middle class to buy industrial products, arbitrary use of Crown powers to extract revenue resulted in low credibility and hence high interest rates) and tried to raise revenue by hiking taxes. This was in conflict with the interests of the dominant class: a mix of landed ``nobility'' of the Third Estates, traditional ``sword'' aristocracy, the clergy, and all people who enjoyed privileges in form of tax exemptions. Because their ``proprietary wealth'' (p. 59) depended on state structure, the main source of tension was disagreement about how to reconstitute the state when the monarchy ran into financial trouble again in 1787 (strained by helping in the American War of Independence). The quarrel paralyzed the regime, and the monarchy lost control of the centralized means of coercion, which unleashed the popular social uprising from below (pp. 66-7).
Manchu China: the structure of imperial China can be defined as the interpenetration of (i) an agrarian economy and society of villages, and (ii) an Imperial state administration (p. 68). The dominant class was based upon office-holding and ownership of surplus land and wealth. The gentry comprised of landlord families with literati members who depended on imperial military backing and status of employment, while the state depended on them to manage to huge agrarian state (pp. 71-2). The ``opening of China'' by Western European industrial states coincided with (a) the traditional economy reaching the limits of expansion vis-à-vis population growth, and (b) the financial and administrative weakening of the Imperial authorities (pp. 73-4). The latter was result of Manchus' reliance on local gentry-led armies instead of the corrupt and inefficient Imperial army during the peasant rebellions caused by (a). Although the peasant rebellions were put down, the balance of power tilted toward the local gentry, who expropriated most of the tax revenue. The Manchu dynasty started to reform between 1901 and 1911, establishing local representative assemblies, which were quickly transformed into platforms from which provincial gentry could advocate liberal decentralization (p. 78). The attempt of the central government to buy out railroad projects from provincial groups threatened their vested interests and precipitated the revolution of 1911, which led to the overthrow of the dynasty. Divided, regionalized loyalties precluded the creation of a unified state until 1949, when a revolutionary-national power with lower-class support seized the opening.
Romanov Russia: Peter's reforms created a highly centralized bureaucratic state, but did not change the backward serf economy. The Crimean debacle spurred modernizing reforms from above (Emancipation of serfs in 1861). The weak landed nobility-dependent upon the state to supplement insufficient income, and compelled to lifelong civil or military service-could not oppose the reform (pp. 86-7). Although it could not bring down the autocracy in favor of liberal constitutionalist program, the landed nobility could manipulate the implementation of Emancipation to maximize their interests, which blocked agrarian modernization (p. 89). The state-guided industrialization under the Witte program resulted in rapid growth, but occasioned the conditions for revolution by creating new classes and exacerbating social tensions: (a) the formation of an industrial proletariat disproportionately concentrated in large cities, and (b) increasing indebtedness and dependence on Western capital (pp. 92-3). Forced industrialization failed to solve the problem of backwardness due to stagnant agriculture and reinforced hostile social tendencies. Under the strain of the disastrous Russo-Japanese War, the 1905 Revolution exploded and resulted in the promulgation of civil liberties and representative Duma. With the conclusion of peace, however, the Tsar used the troops to crush the revolution. This could not happen in 1917, when war-weary workers and soldiers in Petrograd toppled the regime from below. Although a ``Provisional Government'' was established, without the protection of the Imperial administration and armies, the urban privileged strata and the landed nobility were vulnerable to assaults from below (p. 99).
Control cases (Prussia and Japan): unlike Russia, neither had a backward agrarian sector with class relations inimical to modernization. Unlike France/China, neither had a dominant landed upper class with entrenched interests which could block state reform. In the first case, international pressure caused deprivation and stress on the economy fettered by backwardness in the agrarian sector. In the other cases, the breakdown of administrative and military organizations resulted in revolutionary situations (p. 110).
Occurrence of Peasant Insurrections: peasant revolts were the crucial ingredient in all social revolutions, and in the three cases, they were widespread and directed against landlords. The organized capacity for collective action depended upon (a) degree and kind of solidarity of peasant communities-smallholder families who possess and work the land on their own are more prone to revolt than large estates worked by serfs or landless laborers; (b) degree of peasant autonomy from supervision by landlords-agrarian orders with sanctioning machineries that are centrally bureaucratically controlled more are vulnerable than ones where landlords control them locally, and (c) relaxation of state coercive sanctions against revolts-when dominant class has backed itself into revolutionary crisis under pressure in a modernizing world (pp. 115-7).
France: heavy taxation (especially proprietorial rents) had subjected peasants, many of whom own their land, to life near or below subsistence levels. However, the structure of village communal life ensured that any revolts would not be directed against private property in general but against seigniorial dues and tithes only (p. 126). The failed grain harvest in 1788 caused contraction of the economy and the rising prices of bread incited bread riots, much like it had happened before. This time, however, spontaneous and autonomous revolts became widespread because they coincided with (a) quarrels among privileged elites, (b) the drawing up of local grievance lists (on king's orders) heightened expectations of the peasantry, (c) disorganization of policy and army left regime with no means of coercion, (d) urban forces' attack on ``aristocratic reaction'' encouraged attacks on exploitative practices of nobles (pp. 123-4).
China: peasants lacked ties among themselves and there was no communal solidarity. The gentry co-opted peasants, thereby enhancing power in relation to imperial officials and deflecting potential unrest from themselves (pp. 149-50). The peasant revolts were not directed against the gentry, but against the Imperial state. However, the gentry was not invulnerable indefinitely-it found itself at odds with the state when only the unified administrative and coercive power of the state could back its position in the long run (p. 152). In periods of economic crisis, marginal poor-peasant outcasts provided the support of elite-led rebellions. The Communist Party tapped into peasant social banditry to organize the Red Army. Once given institutional support, peasants obtained collective leverage against the landlords and revolted violently (pp. 153-4).
Russia: the Emancipation initiated by the Tsar was designed to enhance social stability and political vitality of the imperial system (p. 128). Instead, because details of implementation were left to local nobles, the result was to leave the peasants economically worse off, especially in the Central Black Earth and adjacent Volga regions, where ``cut-off'' lands were left in hands of nobles and the obshchina controlled peasant property. At the same time, Emancipation removed much of the political control of peasants by nobles or the state (pp. 129-32). With economic decline the exploitative rentier relations became focus of resistance by the autonomous peasant communities-the revolutions of 1905 and 1917 sparked by defeat in war were overwhelmingly economic, not political, directed against landowners (p. 134). In the first case, the regime used the troops, but in the second, the complete disintegration of the army left it with no means of coercion. Unlike France, the collective norms in the obshchina did not respect private property, with the result that the peasant revolution not only abolished rental claims of landlords, but also redistributed landed private properties (p. 137).
Control cases (Britain and Germany): the reason revolutionary situations did not develop into social revolutions was the absence of peasant rebellions, which was due to class and political structures that gave power to landlords, not peasant communities (p. 140). In England, landlords owned two-thirds of the land, there were no peasant-run village assemblies, and the political revolution was led by the nobles. In Germany, the Prussian king was able to use the army to stop the liberal revolution of 1848-50. East of the Elbe, Junkers retained strong control of land, keeping the Prussian army intact and available (p. 146).
Outcomes of Social Revolutions: peasant revolts against landlords transformed agrarian relations; autocratic monarchies gave way to bureaucratic and mass-incorporating national states. Success was possible because leaders could mobilize lower-class groups. The analysis focuses upon the creation of new state organizations within the social-revolutionary situations (p. 163). Political leaders are regarded as actors struggling to maintain state power-they came from the educated marginal elites oriented to state employment (p. 167). Revolutionary ideologies could help them because (i) these were universalistic creeds, (ii) enjoined them to mobilize the masses for political activities, (iii) were secular ``totalitarian'' outlooks that justified usage of unlimited means for political ends (p. 170). However, ideologically oriented leaders were limited by existing structural conditions and changing context of revolution, both domestic and international. The variation of outcomes is explained by the way the old regimes broke down, the kind of peasant revolts facilitated by existing agrarian structures, and international situations (p. 280).
France: the revolution was more bureaucratic, mass-incorporating, and state-strengthening than bourgeois (p. 179). It was dominated by bureaucrats, soldiers, and owners of real estate, not industrialists or capitalists; it also hindered capitalist industrialization and fostered reliance on state to shield the inefficient production from foreign competition. The revolution strengthened executive-administrative dominance within government rather than parliamentary-representative arrangements (pp. 177-8). It did eliminate the ``medieval rubbish,'' which depended on the monarchy for its existence and limited its functioning: seigniorial privileges were abolished, the Nation became the source of legitimate political sovereignty, the state was partitioned into uniform rationally ordered jurisdictions, nationwide system of laws, taxation, and customs was introduced, the central government expanded in size and functions (p. 179). Some accomplishments of the new regime: (i) professionalisation of the officer corps and emergence of a national army with the levée en masse (p. 197); (ii) growth of the administrative machinery and identification of executive functions with implementation of the nation's will-the real state apparatus working behind the scenes, anonymously (p. 202); (iii) extended and more intrusive reach of state (p. 203).
China: the new regime was more centralized, mass-incorporating, and fully rationalized and bureaucratic than the old one (p. 236). The only way to complete the revolution was to tap the support of the insurrectionary, productive, and political energies of the peasantry, which the Communists were forced to do after their split with the Kuomintang and the KMT's failure to consolidate state power on an urban basis in the face of the Japanese invasion of 1937. The CCP strategy-peasant-based guerilla warfare-put the party in direct contact with the peasants and it consolidated administrative control during the United Front (p. 258). The land redistribution reform in the Liberated Areas in 1946-7 led to genuine revolution from below for now peasants were able to mobilize and strike against landlords in ways they could not do before (p. 262). Some features of the new regime: (i) large bureaucratic state, with extended outreach and centralized power (p. 263); (ii) destruction of locally and regionally based power blocks that had undermined the authority of the old regime (p. 264); (iii) all governmental organizations permeated by Party controls (p. 265); (iv) from 1957 onward, agricultural development alongside with investment in technologically advanced industries (p. 269); (v) coordination and responsible leadership at local and provincial as well as national levels (p. 271); (vi) premium placed on organized political leadership, even compared to the USSR (p. 272); (vii) relative egalitarianism, with small income differentials and small inequalities of social prestige (p. 273).
Russia: the Soviet system that crystallized after 1928 was more formally egalitarian and popularly inclusive and more rank-ridden, effectively authoritarian, and coercive than the pre-revolutionary absolutist system (p. 231). The consolidation of state under the Bolsheviks relied on naked coercion-the creation of the Red Army, which succeeded in crushing counterrevolutionary domestic forces and being developed into a secure basis for centralized rule by the Party (p. 218). Even though the NEP displaced the dismal ``War Communism,'' it failed to induce peasants to supply the cities with grain at artificially low prices. Stalin's forced collectivization had two advantages: (i) it was fast and promised rapid achievement of higher levels of economic and military development, and (ii) the reversion to Civil War-style activism it was appealing to urban-based Party teams (p. 224). The state procurement of produce at minimum cost was put to use in the forced state-controlled industrialization. Some accomplishments of the new regime: (i) predominance of a Party-state with huge bureaucracy and less concerned with social opposition (p. 226); (ii) the complete elimination of estates of nobles with their privileges (p. 227); (iii) forced draft-industrialization with workers losing influence over hiring, wages, production, or hours (p. 228); (iv) agrarian collectivization with peasants losing their small holdings and collective village autonomy (p. 229); (v) development of hierarchy within the civil administration and the army with complete elimination of egalitarian norms (p. 229); (vi) extraordinary reliance of the regime upon administratively organized coercion and terror for ruling the citizens and purging its own cadres (p. 230).

Historiographical Observations

Chapter 1 motivates the study explaining the shortcomings of Marxist, aggregate psychological, systems-value consensus, and political conflict theories; motivates the approach, method, and case selection. Chapter 2 covers the emergence of revolutionary political crises out of objective conditions. Chapter 3 covers the peasant insurrections made possible by agrarian structure. The two, taken together constitute sufficient conditions for social revolutions-see summary and table on pp. 154-7. Part II (chapters 4 through 7) deals with the outcomes of the social revolutions-see summary and table on pp. 282-3.

Bibliographical Notes

Extensive bibliography on the three main cases, and theoretical background; index; end-notes; 6 maps, and 2 tables.

June 28, 2001. BLS

@BOOK{skocpol-79:states,
    TITLE     = {States and Social Revolutions},
    AUTHOR    = {Theda Skocpol},
    YEAR      = {1979},
    PUBLISHER = {Cambridge University Press},
    ADDRESS   = {Cambridge},
    ISBN      = {0-521-29499-1},
    NOTE      = {Pp. 407, bibliography, index}
}